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from M. Lacombe and others, except as regards the explanatory value of such general psychological factors as those above cited.

M. Rauh, however, urged that scientific explanations are not all of one type. And here, it seems to me, lies the weakness of M. Simiand's position. Every event takes place, both as a particular case of a general law and as a part of a totality. From this distinction result two types of explanation, which may be indicated by such terms as momentum and direction, action and movement, formal and final, mechanical and teleological. It has been urged that no science is free from both types of explanation. The contention may be wrong, but certainly we are not in a position to ignore it, as M. Simiand would ignore it, particularly in the realm of history, where, if anywhere, the distinction is valid. Perhaps the real purport of his paper is to limit the use of the term explanation. In that case his statement is liable to serious misunderstanding; for it seems a perversion of terms to say, as he does, that an explosion is explained by the expansive power of gases, but is not explained by the motives of the man that puts match to powder. While his paper may well promote precision in offering general explanations of particular events, it is not likely to persuade historians that general explanations are the only ones they may offer.

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*La méthode de Descartes.* A. HANNEQUIN. *Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale,* November, 1906. Pp. 755–774.

This paper is an unfinished first chapter of a projected work on Descartes, which the talented author had been preparing for some years, the work having been repeatedly interrupted by the ravages of the disease that caused his untimely death last summer, July 5, 1906. The editor of the *Revue* expresses his appreciation of the young philosopher's promise and worth in a foot-note to the article here reviewed, and also publishes, in the same number, another fragment by him, on the philosophy of Leibniz, which was also to have introduced a projected work.

The revolution which Descartes accomplished in philosophy was a necessary consequence of the revolution which Galileo had brought about in science. If the experimental method is specially characteristic of modern science, this is but the result of the need first voiced by Descartes, but felt by all investigators of rank, the need, namely, of applying mathematics universally to the solution of scientific problems. Descartes placed himself at the center of this new view of things, and developed a theory of knowledge that for the first time clearly exhibited the true relation between thought and things, giving to mathematics the supreme methodological position it deserves.

The *Regulæ* of Descartes contain the first exposition of this method, and constitute, in the opinion of Hannequin, the most valuable source for the understanding of its nature. To reach knowledge, or certainty, which are convertible terms, the human mind avails itself of only one method.

Mathematics, since it admittedly gives us certain knowledge, must disclose the clue to this method. Here we find only two conditions under which certainty is found, intuition and deduction, both of which, however, ultimately reduce to one, *viz.,* intuition. Intuition is not imagination or perception, but rational insight into the nature of an object immediately apprehended as simple and distinct. Hence the object is either apprehended truly, or not at all; error is excluded. Deduction presupposes an intuition, from which it passes immediately and by necessity to another term. It is the process by which the mind makes knowledge whose certainty is not in itself evident, to rest upon self-evident truth. Deduction is in a sense only intuition, but it requires a *movement* of the mind from one term to another, and can thus only exist by the aid of memory. It consists, not in the intuition of a second term, but in the intuition of a relation as making this second term necessarily dependent on the first, as in the case of an arithmetical progression. According to the usually accepted theory of the judgment, it simply renders explicit a preexistent but implicit relation between preexistent terms. But according to Descartes's theory of the judgment, it is a process of *deriving* a second term by means of a relation. The relation determines the succeeding terms, not the terms the relation. In Descartes the judgment is an act of constitutive thought, first by intuition positing a first term, and then by means of a relation giving this first term a complement, or a series of complements, which without the act of judgment would not exist. It is not the syllogism, but the judgment as thus defined, which constitutes the essence of thought.

Mathematical deduction is never syllogistic. Only two concepts are basal in mathematics, order and magnitude. Order requires no middle term for its derivation, since each element follows immediately upon its predecessor. And magnitude, while it requires for its expression a unit, which appears to be a third or middle term, nevertheless presents but a superficial similarity to the syllogistic process. The syllogistic middle is always a species, the mathematical unit is never a species. Descartes has thus hurled King Syllogism from his usurper's throne in the realm of knowledge, and made way instead for the rightful heir and claimant, mathematical induction.

The article, of which I have in the above attempted to give a summary, is written in a vivacious and lucid style. A criticism of its content would be a criticism of Descartes, and quite out of place in this review of a fragment published as a memorial.

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*Die Bedeutung der nichteuklidischen Geometrie in ihrem Verhältniss zu Kant's Theorie der mathematischen Erkenntniss.* W. MEINECKE. *Kantstudien,* June, 1906. Pp. 209–232.

The impossibility of proving the parallel axiom was the starting-point of the so-called non-Euclidean geometry. Lobachevski's method